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COMMENTS ON MARTIN LYBECKER’S 
ENHANCED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
MERCER E. BULLARD∗ 
Martin Lybecker’s article, Enhanced Governance for Mutual Funds: A 
Flawed Concept that Deserves Serious Reconsideration,1 raises significant 
issues regarding the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
(“Commission” or “SEC”) exercise of its exemptive authority. Under that 
authority, the Commission amended a number of exemptive rules under 
the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“’40 Act”) to require that mutual 
funds relying on those rules conform to enumerated governance practices 
(“fund governance reforms”).2 Lybecker argues that the fund governance 
reforms deserve serious reconsideration primarily because, in his opinion, 
they (1) were unauthorized, (2) were not adequately justified, and (3) will 
be of “questionable efficacy.”3 
To the contrary, the Commission has ample authority to adopt the fund 
governance reforms, and the recent mutual fund scandal provided more 
than adequate justification for them. The Commission has broad 
exemptive authority under the ’40 Act, and the incorporation of 
 ∗ Assistant Professor of Law, University of Mississippi School of Law. This author has 
interests in the issues discussed in this article in a variety of current and former capacities. Neither 
these comments nor Lybecker’s article have been updated to reflect developments in litigation 
concerning the independent governance rules discussed herein. In June 2005, the D.C. Circuit found 
that the SEC had acted within its authority to adopt the rules but had violated the Administrative 
Procedures Act by not adequately considering (1) the costs of complying with the governance rules 
and (2) disclosure requirements as an alternative to the rules, Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 
133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The SEC reconsidered the proposal in light of these concerns and decided not to 
amend the rules. See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,985, 
70 Fed. Reg. 39,390 (July 7, 2005). The court subsequently denied a petition for rehearing on its 
finding that the SEC had acted within its authority, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 19602 (Sep. 9, 2005), but 
granted a stay of the January 2006 compliance date. On April 7, 2006, the court vacated the 
governance rules on the ground that the Commission had not adequately considered their cost, but 
withheld the issuance of the mandate for ninety days to afford the Commission an opportunity to 
reopen the record for comment. The Commission had not acted on the court’s decision as of this 
writing. 
 1. Martin Lybecker, Enhanced Governance for Mutual Funds: A Flawed Concept that Deserves 
Serious Reconsideration, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1045 (2005). 
 2. The amendments generally require the following: (1) an independent chairman; (2) a 
seventy-five percent independent board; (3) an annual self-assessment by the board; (4) quarterly 
meetings of independent directors; and (5) authority for the independent directors to hire their own 
staff. See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,323, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 3472 (proposed Jan. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Governance Proposing Release]. See also Investment 
Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,250, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378 (Aug. 2, 
2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270) [hereinafter Governance Adopting Release]. 
 3. Lybecker, supra note 1, at 1081, 1084, 1085. 
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governance conditions into rules adopted under that authority mirrors the 
way in which Congress has used governance requirements in the Act.4 
Both Congress and the Commission have long used governance 
requirements to protect investors, generally for the purpose of monitoring 
and managing conflicts of interest between funds and their sponsors. The 
recent mutual fund scandal confirmed the risks to shareholders presented 
by these conflicts of interest and accordingly provided more than adequate 
justification for strengthening the governance conditions in the exemptive 
rules. 
Whereas Lybecker is unpersuasive regarding the lack of authority and 
justification for the fund governance reforms, he may be correct that their 
efficacy is questionable. He essentially argues that the reforms will fail 
because independent directors lack the ability to serve in the watchdog 
capacity that the exemptive rules assign to them. It is hard to know the 
answer to the efficacy question, however, not only because it is inherently 
predictive, but also because the Commission has never explained exactly 
what it expects independent directors to do in the context of the exemptive 
rules. 
Indeed, Lybecker’s argument is partly that the Commission has failed 
to make the case as to its authority or the justification or efficacy of the 
reforms. The relevant proposing and adopting releases appear to base the 
fund governance reforms more on a general disagreement with Congress’s 
decisions—for example, not to require an independent fund chairman and 
to require only a forty percent independent board—than on the view that 
the reforms are necessary to protect investors specifically in the context of 
the exemptive rules into which the reforms have been incorporated.5 There 
is no evidence that the Commission knows whether the independent 
directors have been effective in the context of the operation of the 
exemptive rules in the past, or that it has any way of measuring their 
effectiveness in the future. The problem may be more serious, as there also 
is no evidence that the Commission knows if the exemptive rules 
themselves have been effective in protecting investors. Perhaps it is not 
the fund governance reforms alone that deserve serious reconsideration, 
but also the authority, justification and efficacy of the exemptive rules 
themselves. 
 4. See discussion infra notes 6–15. 
 5. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.10f-3, 270.12b-1, 270.15a-4, 270.17a-7, 270.17a-8, 270.17d-1, 
270.17e-1, 270.17g-1, 270.18f-3, 270.23c-3. 
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ENHANCED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AUTHORITY? 
The Commission based its authority to enact the reforms on its 
authority to grant exemptions from and adopt rules under the ’40 Act.6 
These exemptions permit funds and their affiliates to engage in practices 
that would otherwise be prohibited under the Act. With the power to grant 
exemptions goes the power to impose conditions (such as the reforms) on 
the exemptions. Lybecker argues that the fund governance reforms are 
extralegal because the Commission used its exemptive authority as a 
convenient vehicle to accomplish unrelated goals.7 
The SEC’s authority to impose governance conditions in exemptive 
rules has a strong foundation. From its inception, the federal regulation of 
mutual funds has intruded upon state control over corporate governance 
matters, in many cases specifically with respect to the role of fund boards 
and independent directors. Lybecker asserts that “Congress was very 
respectful of state law when it passed and subsequently amended the 
Investment Company Act,”8 but Professor Langevoort’s comment that 
“much of the ’40 Act rests on a repudiation of the traditional protections of 
state law” is more accurate.9 That fund governance is a federal interest is 
well established. 
In a number of provisions of the ’40 Act, Congress has carefully 
tailored governance requirements to the particular circumstances. The 
Act’s default rule is that at least forty percent of a fund’s board must be 
independent,10 but this minimum is raised or lowered depending on the 
situation. Congress raised the minimum to seventy-five percent for three 
years following the assignment of the advisory contract, when it believed 
investor protection concerns were heightened.11 It deemed only one 
independent director to be sufficient, however, for no-load funds with an 
advisory fee of less than one percent and, among other things, only one 
class of securities outstanding.12 Congress required approval by 
independent directors in certain circumstances, such as for the approval of 
the advisory contract.13 
 6. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-6(c), 80a-12(b) (2000). 
 7. Lybecker, supra note 1, at 1060. 
 8. Id. at 1083. 
 9. Donald Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: 
Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1017 (2005). 
 10. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2005). 
 11. Id. § 80a-15(f)(1)(A). 
 12. Id. § 80a-10(d). 
 13. Id. § 80a-15(c). 
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Congress also provided a mechanism whereby the ’40 Act’s 
prohibitions could be relaxed as circumstances warranted. It granted the 
Commission broad authority to exempt any person or transaction from the 
Act “consistent with the protection of investors and the purposes fairly 
intended by . . . [the Act],”14 and granted the Commission rulemaking 
authority in a number of substantive provisions of the Act.15  
The Commission has adopted dozens of rules and granted thousands of 
individual exemptions under these grants of authority, many of which 
include fund governance conditions.16 Each rule and exemption permits an 
activity that the ’40 Act otherwise would prohibit; each governance 
condition is accordingly designed (justifiably or not) to ensure that the 
exemption is “consistent with the protection of investors and the purposes 
fairly intended . . . [by the Act].”17 The SEC’s use of the governance 
conditions in these rules and exemptions mirrors Congress’s tailoring of 
the Act’s governance provisions to the particular circumstances. Lybecker 
argues, in effect, that the Commission lacks the authority to include 
governance conditions in exemptions for the protection of investors, 
notwithstanding that Congress itself used governance conditions for 
precisely the same reason. 
Congress’s grant of broad authority to the Commission to repeal 
statutory prohibitions logically must include similarly broad authority to 
decide when additional governance measures are necessary to protect 
investors. This is precisely the kind of determination Congress made 
repeatedly in the Act. If there is a genuine issue as to the SEC’s authority, 
it is whether the Commission has the authority to grant an exemption 
without requiring, for example, that the fund’s chairman be independent if 
it believed that an independent chairman was necessary for the protection 
of investors. 
ENHANCED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: JUSTIFICATION? 
The fact that the Commission has the authority to adopt the fund 
governance reforms does not tell us whether the conditions are justified. 
Lybecker generally argues that the reforms were not justified because 
there was not “a one-to-one relationship between the justifications for the 
[fund governance reforms] and the principal features of the scandals in 
 14. Id. § 80a-6(c). 
 15. See, e.g., id. §§ 80a-10(f), 80a-12(b), 80a-17(d). 
 16. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.10f-3, 270.12b-1(b), 270.17d-1 (2005). 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (2005). 
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2003–2004.”18 There are actually other circumstances, in addition to the 
mutual fund scandal, that justified fund governance reforms,19 but only the 
scandal needs to be addressed here because it, by itself, provided sufficient 
justification for the reforms. 
There was, in fact, a “one-to-one relationship” between the reforms and 
the scandal. The abuses underlying the mutual fund scandal resulted from 
conduct for which fund directors, and particularly independent fund 
directors and non-independent chairmen, had direct or indirect 
responsibility. In some cases, non-independent fund chairmen directly 
participated in or facilitated the abuses.20 The governance reforms are a 
direct response to demonstrated boardroom failures that involve the very 
conflicts of interest that Congress and the Commission have long looked 
to independent directors to monitor and manage. 
One abuse underlying the mutual fund scandal was pricing arbitrage, 
which occurs when a fund undervalues its portfolio and attentive 
arbitrageurs purchase fund shares at a discount to their market value.21 
Pricing arbitrage harms non-arbitrageur shareholders because it dilutes 
their interests in the fund, with the amount of their losses providing the 
arbitrageurs’ profits. The undervaluing of fund portfolio securities often 
occurs when market quotations for the securities are not readily available, 
in which case the securities must be fair-valued in good faith “by the board 
of directors.”22 The failure of fund directors to ensure that their funds’ 
securities were properly fair-valued was directly responsible for pricing 
arbitrage opportunities.23 
Lybecker argues that directors’ fair valuation responsibilities are too 
complex, requiring an “understanding [of] the nuances of stock prices in a 
 18. Lybecker, supra note 1, at 1084. 
 19. For example, Lybecker discusses two other circumstances: revenue sharing and directed 
brokerage. Id. at 1084–85. 
 20. See, e.g., Strong Capital Mgmt., Inc., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-11498 ¶ 3 (May 20, 2004), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49741.htm (settlement with non-independent chairman of 
mutual fund complex); see generally Letter from Michael Oxley, Chairman, Committee on Financial 
Services, House of Representatives, to William Donaldson, Chairman, Securities and Exchange 
Commission (May 20, 2004), http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/ic.pdf. 
 21. For a detailed discussion of the mutual fund scandal and the mechanics of fund arbitrage, see 
Mercer Bullard, The Mutual Fund as a Firm: Frequent Trading, Fund Arbitrage and the SEC’s 
Response to the Mutual Fund Scandal, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1271 (2006). 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41)(B)(ii) (2005). 
 23. See Bullard, supra note 21, at 1285–87, 1288. Although the scandal involved another form of 
arbitrage known as late trading, this author generally would agree that fund directors’ failure to detect 
and prevent late trading probably would not alone justify the fund governance reforms. Late trading, 
unlike pricing arbitrage, was not a problem that had been well-known in the industry, see generally id. 
Lybecker is correct that it generally would be unreasonable to hold fund directors directly responsible 
for “rooting out a determined late trader.” Lybecker, supra note 1, at 1085. 
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country facing a natural disaster that has imposed restrictions on 
repatriating profits.”24 Admittedly, such a situation may pose a challenging 
task for a board (although it is not clear why this should excuse a violation 
of a legal duty), but it has nothing to do with the scandal. Arbitrageurs did 
not exploit stale prices resulting from “natural disasters” or “restrictions 
on repatriating profits,” which occur infrequently and could not sustain a 
profitable, systematic arbitrage strategy. Rather, pricing arbitrage was 
based on knowledge of commonplace events, such as a rise in the value of 
the S&P 500 index.25 Arbitrage opportunities had been well-documented 
in the academic literature and financial media for years,26 and directors of 
funds in fund complexes that were untouched by the scandal, such as 
Vanguard, Fidelity and T. Rowe Price, were able to implement fair value 
procedures with success. 
A second scandal-related justification for the fund governance reforms 
is the funds’ violations of their own frequent trading policies.27 Funds 
often permitted pricing arbitrageurs to trade fund shares more frequently 
than permitted by the funds’ prospectuses. Fund directors, like directors of 
other entities that sell their securities publicly, are responsible for the 
accuracy of the prospectus. One should reasonably expect that fund 
directors will take steps to ensure that the fund manager is operating the 
fund consistent with the terms of the prospectus, including the pricing of 
the fund’s portfolio securities and trading of fund shares. If a fund limits 
frequent trading, the board should have procedures designed to determine 
whether frequent trading is occurring in violation of the fund’s policy. 
Lybecker argues that limiting frequent trading was not possible 
because only intermediaries—such as 401(k) plan administrators, broker-
dealers, and variable annuity providers—had access to records of many 
shareholder transactions; therefore, fund directors “could not” obtain 
information about shareholders’ transactions.28 If this were true, it would 
still beg the question of why directors authorized disclosures containing 
false statements of the funds’ frequent trading policies. But funds could, in 
fact, obtain information about shareholders’ transactions simply by 
limiting the sale of fund shares to those intermediaries who agreed to 
provide such information to the funds. Granted, funds may choose not to 
 24. Lybecker, supra note 1, at 1085. 
 25. See Bullard, supra note 21, at 1285–90. 
 26. See id. at 1288–89. 
 27. See generally Bullard, supra note 21. 
 28. Lybecker, supra note 1, at 1089. 
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take this action because they lack the market power to do so,29 but market 
exigencies do not excuse knowing prospectus violations. 
In addition to the mutual fund scandal of 2003–2004, the 
contemporaneous breakpoint scandal also justified the fund governance 
reforms.30 Mutual funds frequently offer discounts on sales commissions 
that are based on volume or other factors, which are known as 
“breakpoints.” Joint SEC/NYSE/NASD inspections conducted between 
November 2002 and January 2003 of forty-three broker-dealers found that 
they overcharged investors on commissions in thirty-two percent of 
transactions that were eligible for a discount.31 Breakpoint schedules, like 
frequent trading policies, are disclosed in fund prospectuses, and fund 
directors accordingly are obligated to take reasonable steps to ensure that 
shareholders receive breakpoints as promised in the prospectus. 
Fund directors’ lapses involving pricing arbitrage, frequent trading and 
breakpoints provided more than adequate justification for the fund 
governance reforms, especially with respect to the role of independent 
directors. The primary role of independent directors is to provide a check 
on conflicts of interest between funds and their sponsors, and the conduct 
underlying the scandal arose largely as a result of this conflict of interest. 
Fund managers permitted, and even encouraged, arbitrageurs and frequent 
trading because the managers received side payments, such as fees paid on 
additional investments by arbitrageurs in the managers’ hedge funds. 
Breakpoint overcharges inured to the benefit of fund distributors. The fund 
governance reforms are intended to counteract the demonstrated 
willingness of conflicted fund affiliates to exploit fund shareholders. 
 29. See generally Mutual Fund Redemption Fees, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,782, 
70 Fed. Reg. 13,328, at 13,328 (Mar. 18, 2005) (to be codified 17 C.F.R. pt. 270) (“The competitive 
pressure of marketing funds, especially smaller funds, coupled with the costs of imposing redemption 
fees in omnibus accounts, may deter some funds from imposing redemption fees. Intermediaries may 
use their market power to prevent funds from applying the fees, or to provide incentives for fund 
groups to waive fees.”). 
 30. Alternatively, this author disagrees with Lybecker’s contention that conduct involving 
revenue sharing and directed brokerage were part of the scandal or part of the asserted justification for 
the governance reforms. Lybecker, supra note 1, at 1084–85. 
 31. Joint SEC/NASD/NYSE Report of Examinations of Broker-Dealers Regarding Discounts on 
Front-End Sales Charges on Mutual Funds (Mar. 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/break 
pointrep.htm. 
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ENHANCED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: EFFICACY? 
Lybecker argues that, even if the fund governance reforms were 
authorized and justified, it “strains credulity to believe that [the 
governance reforms] can produce an effective compliance program that is 
more than a shadowy substitute for and incomplete accessory to [the 
SEC’s staff].”32 He describes fund directors as superficially competent 
part-timers who rely heavily on their legal counsel and the fund manager 
“to bring important matters to their attention.”33 Accordingly, the fund 
governance reforms reflect an ill-advised attempt to change the 
“dynamics” of the boardroom by strengthening the hand of the 
independent directors.34 
It is not clear how Lybecker’s argument is different from the argument 
that independent fund directors serve no purpose at all. Either they can 
provide an effective check on conflicts between the fund and its affiliates 
or they cannot. If they can, it is reasonable to assume that the more 
authority they have, the more effectively they can play this role. 
Lybecker’s efficacy argument assumes that independent directors simply 
cannot serve in this capacity, without explaining why. 
A more interesting question is whether independent directors do, in 
fact, serve effectively as watchdogs. One might argue that while 
independent directors can be effective watchdogs, the mutual fund scandal 
was the best evidence that in practice they are not effective watchdogs. If 
the justification for the fund governance reforms is that recent abuses 
reflect independent directors’ failure to fulfill existing responsibilities, 
why will requiring more of them and/or granting them more authority 
improve fund oversight?35 Or more specifically, why will these reforms 
provide better protection to shareholders in the context of the exemptive 
rules?  
Lybecker does not answer these questions, but he probably would 
agree that, assuming that independent directors had the capacity to be 
effective watchdogs, they need more guidance to do so. The administrative 
history of the exemptive rules provides little guidance as to exactly what 
 32. Lybecker, supra note 1, at 1086. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.  
 35. See U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, EXEMPTIVE RULE AMENDMENT OF 2004: THE 
INDEPENDENT CHAIR COMMISSION, at 51 (Apr. 2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/indchair.pdf 
[hereinafter INDEPENDENT CHAIR REPORT] (“The Commission determined that the breakdowns in fund 
management and compliance controls raised troubling questions about the ability of many fund boards 
more generally to effectively oversee the management of funds.”). 
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the Commission expects directors to do to protect shareholders. For that 
matter, the Commission has provided no guidance as to what it expected 
independent directors to have done to prevent the abuses underlying the 
mutual fund scandal. Nor has any independent director been charged with 
violating the securities laws in connection with the scandal. In many 
discussions with fund directors, the most frequent complaint that this 
author hears is that the Commission does not give them sufficient 
guidance. 
One way to provide more guidance for fund directors would be to 
create a self-regulatory organization for mutual funds, as discussed in 
Professor Seligman’s article in this issue.36 The lack of guidance for 
directors was also the primary impetus for this author’s proposal to create 
a Mutual Fund Oversight Board that would be responsible for (and only 
for) establishing uniform minimum standards for fund governance.37 The 
Commission could perform this function, but recent events support the 
view that it lacks the flexibility to ensure that such standards are kept 
current.38 Despite widespread and longstanding evidence of stale pricing 
by mutual funds,39 the Commission allowed the problem to grow 
unchecked until the office of the New York Attorney General initiated its 
investigation. 
Surprisingly, Lybecker does not address the most vociferous attack on 
the efficacy of the fund governance reforms. Members of Congress, SEC 
Commissioners and certain industry representatives have asserted that the 
reforms would cause reduced investment performance and increased 
expenses.40 That the Commission ignored empirical evidence supporting 
this contention has been a centerpiece of the Chamber of Commerce’s 
 36. See Joel Seligman, Should Investment Companies Be Subject To A New Statutory Self-
Regulatory Organization? 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1115 (2005). 
 37. See Review of Mutual Fund Industry Investigations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 2 (2004) (statement of Mercer Bullard, President 
and Founder, Fund Democracy, Inc.); see generally Patrick McGeehan, With Critics at the Door, 
Funds Propose Cleaning Own House, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2003, at C1. A bill proposed by Senator 
John Kerry would have created a Mutual Oversight Board, see Mutual Fund Investor Protection Act of 
2003, S. 1958, 108th Cong. § 201 (2003). Two other Senate bills would have required that the 
Commission study the proposal. See Mutual Fund Investor Confidence Restoration Act of 2003, S. 
1971, 108th Cong. § 401 (2003); Mutual Fund Transparency Act of 2003, S. 1822, 108th Cong. § 3(e) 
(2003). 
 38. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MUTUAL FUND TRADING ABUSES: LESSONS CAN BE 
LEARNED FROM SEC NOT HAVING DETECTED VIOLATIONS AT AN EARLIER STAGE, GAO-05-313 
(Apr. 2005). 
 39. See id. at 16; Bullard, supra note 21, at 1288–90. 
 40. See, e.g., Governance Adopting Release, supra note 2 (Commissioners Cynthia A. Glassman 
& Paul S. Atkins dissenting); see also Edward Johnson, ‘Interested’—and Proud of It!, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 17, 2004, at A20. 
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challenge to the reforms.41 After the Commission rejected an industry 
study that purported to prove this effect,42 Congress required that the 
Commission revisit this question,43 and the Commission again found that 
there was no evidence that such a causal relationship existed.44 
The problem with the debate about the effect of the reforms on fund 
performance and fees is that the efficacy of the reforms is not primarily a 
function of their effect on performance or fees, but rather on fund 
directors’ effectiveness in protecting investors in the context of the 
exemptive rules. The question of whether the reforms will cause higher 
fees and/or lower performance is thus a secondary factor. Even if such a 
causal relationship could be proved, one would still have to determine 
whether the cost in fees/performance outweighed the benefit of enhanced 
investor protection. 
THE SEC’S RECORD ON AUTHORITY, JUSTIFICATION AND EFFICACY 
The foregoing discusses the authority, justification and efficacy issues 
as an objective matter, but Lybecker’s argument is as much that the SEC 
failed to make its case on these issues as it is about each issue’s intrinsic 
merits. Indeed, there is a real possibility that the U.S. Court of Appeals 
may agree and vacate the rule amendments on this basis. 
One would expect the relevant proposing and adopting releases to 
discuss the role of independent directors in the operation of the exemptive 
rules, but they do not. Rather, the releases present a general policy 
justification for the reforms. The background section of the proposing 
release discusses the Act’s general reliance on “fund boards of directors to 
manage conflicts of interest that the fund adviser inevitably has with the 
fund.”45 The adopting release includes a lengthy discussion of directors’ 
responsibilities in approving advisory agreements under Section 15(c) of 
the Act,46 although the reforms do not apply to such approvals. Congress 
 41. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Case Alert: U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC Mutual 
Fund “Governance” Litigation (Apr. 8, 2005), http://www.uschamber.com/nclc/news/casealerts/ 
ca050408.htm. 
 42. See Governance Adopting Release, supra note 2, at n.52. 
 43. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 2, 118 Stat. 2809, 2910 
(2004); see generally Letter from Michael Oxley, Chairman, and Barney Frank, Ranking Member, 
Committee on Financial Services, House of Representatives, to William Donaldson, Chairman, 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 19, 2004), available at http://financialservices.house 
.gov/media/pdf/1119ltr.pdf. 
 44. See Independent Chair Report, supra note 35, at 73. 
 45. Governance Proposing Release, supra note 2, Part I. 
 46. See Governance Adopting Release, supra note 2, Part II.B. 
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specifically determined that a forty percent independent board with a 
nonindependent chairman was sufficient for purposes of approving the 
advisory agreement; the Commission has no authority to overturn that 
determination. The Commission published a lengthy justification of the 
independent chairman requirement after the reforms were adopted, but the 
report’s discussion of the exemptive rules describes only in general terms 
the role played by the independent directors and how the reforms will 
affect this role.47 
The proposing release also does not explain exactly why the scandal 
justified the reforms. The release states that, “[i]n some cases, boards may 
have simply abdicated their responsibilities, or failed to ask the tough 
questions of advisers; in other cases, boards may have lacked the 
information or organizational structure necessary to play their proper 
role.”48 The Commission offers no specific examples, however, of such 
board lapses in connection with the abuses underlying the scandal.49 
The proposing release separately discusses the requirements for an 
independent chairman, seventy-five percent independent board, annual 
self-assessments, separate sessions and the authority to hire independent 
staff; yet nowhere in these discussions does the Commission tie a 
particular governance reform to any of the exemptive rules.50 Is it so self-
evident, for example, that a fund board with an independent chairman will 
be in a better position to determine whether the fund’s 12b-1 plan is 
reasonably likely to benefit the fund, as required by rule 12b-1? Perhaps, 
but this argument is left unstated. 
 47. See Independent Chair Report, supra note 35, at 14–31, 74–77. In the discussion of the rules, 
the Report states, for example, that if a  
fund relies on rule 10f-3 (one of the Exemptive Rules) to purchase securities from an 
affiliated underwriting syndicate, the board has the responsibility to be “vigilant” not only in 
reviewing the fund’s compliance with the procedures required by rule 10f-3, but also “in 
conducting any additional reviews that it determines are needed to protect the interests of 
investors.” 
Id. at 53–54. The Report also makes three general arguments about how an independent chair will 
enhance compliance: (1) the fund’s chief compliance officer, who was recently required to report 
directly to the board, will report to an independent person, rather than a representative of management; 
(2) up-the-ladder reporting requirements for attorneys under § 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act similarly 
will result in an independent person receiving compliance information; and (3) an independent chair 
will enhance the “boardroom culture” by, for example, promoting “frank discussion of what is in the 
best interests of the fund.” Id. at 74–77. 
 48. Governance Proposing Release, supra note 2, Part I (footnotes omitted). 
 49. See Independent Chair Report, supra note 35, at 31–50. The Independent Chair Report does 
provide three specific examples, implying that compliance reports about the harm caused by arbitrage 
and frequent trading would have been provided directly to the independent chairman under new rules 
requiring that the chief compliance officer report directly to the board. Id. at 74–76. 
 50. See Governance Proposing Release, supra note 2, Parts II.A–II.D. 
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The Commission seems to base the reforms on its general view that the 
’40 Act’s fund governance provisions simply are no longer adequate to 
protect investors. For example, in noting the “many important 
responsibilities assigned” to independent fund directors, the Commission 
cites four specific statutory responsibilities under the ’40 Act.51 But with 
respect to these responsibilities, Congress deemed a forty percent 
independent board with a non-independent chairman to be sufficient. The 
Commission has no authority to overturn these Congressional 
determinations, regardless of how misguided the mutual fund scandal may 
reveal them to be. 
As noted above, much has been made of the lack of empirical support 
for the fund governance reforms, but the true empirical void here is quite 
different from the one commonly cited by critics. The empirical void is not 
the absence of evidence that the reforms will not adversely affect fund 
performance or fees, but rather the absence of any evidence of a 
relationship between enhanced governance and the operation of the 
exemptive rules. Each exemptive rule raises investor protection issues that 
the independent directors are expected to address, but there is no evidence 
that the Commission has any idea how well independent directors have 
served in that role, or more broadly, whether any of the conditions 
imposed in the rules have been successful in protecting investors against 
the potential harms presented by the exempted transactions or products. 
The real empirical void is the nonexistent empirical support for the 
continuation of the exemptive rules themselves, the actual operation of 
which the Commission has effectively disregarded for decades.52 Perhaps 
the reason that the Commission did not adequately explain how the 
reforms were justified by the mutual fund scandal, or were relevant to the 
exemptive rules, is that the Commission simply lacks a clear conception of 
exactly what it is independent fund directors are supposed to do or 
whether or how the exemptive rules are actually working. What truly 
deserves serious reconsideration is the SEC’s exercise of its exemptive 
authority.
 51. Governance Proposing Release, supra note 2, Part I n.10 (citing board responsibilities set 
forth at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2a41, 80a-15(a), 80a-15(b), 80a-15(c) (2005)). 
 52. Fund Democracy has twice based challenges to exemptions on empirical evidence that the 
exempted transactions were not operating consistent with the grant of exemptive relief. See 
Memorandum in Support of Hearing Request, Fund Democracy (May 4, 2000) (analysis of trading of 
exchange-traded funds at discounts and premiums to their net asset values), http://www.fund 
democracy.com/Supporting%20Memo.pdf; Memorandum in Support of Hearing Request, Fund 
Democracy (Mar. 5, 2001) (analysis of use of multiple managers under multi-manage exemptions), 
http://www.funddemocracy.com/Supporting%20 Memorandum.pdf. 
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